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Judgments-Res Judicata-Dismissal.--When decision on
dictional
is based on determination of merits of an
issue before
it eonstitutes a
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that issue.
[5] Marriage~Incidents of Void and Voidable
erty Rights.-Pact that man and woman do not in
belil,ve
are married does not
court
tecting their respective interests in
[ 6] Id.- Annulment- Decree- Conclusiveness.-Regardless of
whether or not husband in annulment action
to establish
his interest in jointly acquired property on
of claim to
one-half int<·rest therein without
to
marital relationship, his subsequent action to establish his
interest on that theory is barred by adjudication in annulment
motion awarding annulment to wife and
to make
of property on ground that
Rights and remedies in respect of
man and woman living together in illicit relations or under
void marriage, note, 31 A.L.R.2d 1255. See also Cal.Jur., Mar§ 21; Am.Jur., Marriage, § 50 et seq.
See Cal.Jur.,
§ 185; Am.Jur.,
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 6] Marriage, § 44;
§ 22; [4] Judgments, § 353(1); [7] Judgments,
Judgments, §§ 395, 396.

Court of Kern
establish title to undivided one-half interest
of
reversed.
Siemon &

>::ilC:UlO>n

and Alfred Siemon for

Kendall & Howell and William A. Howell for Respondent.
J.-Archie B. Shore
to
establish his title to
real and
in the
of defendant
Alberta l\Iae Shore and to secure a partition of the personal
'l'he actions were consolidated for trial. In her
answers, Alberta
that Archie's actions were barred
a decree of annulment between the
and that Archie
had given her his one-half interest in the
while
were
as husband and wife. 'l'itle to all
of the property had
been taken
the parties as
joint tenants. The trial court found that the annulment
decree was not a bar to these actions and that Archie had
not made a
of his interest in the
to Alberta.
It further found that Archie had deeded his interest in
the real property to defendant to
his interest from
unfounded claims
him
third
and that
Alberta held Archie's interest on an oral trust for him.
Since a confidential relationship had existed between the
parties and since the claims against Archie were unfounded,
it concluded that the oral trust ·was enforceable and entered

an annulment
another spouse
to Alberta. It
delicto, and "that the
concerning the character of the yyr.m"'""'"
cause of action of
of law it stated "That the
fault in the
c1iction to make any award of
mnnity in character."
Alberta contends that the
finding and conclusion constitute a binding adjudication that at the time of
the annulment neither
was entitled to relief
the other with
to the
here in question.
the other hand, that a denial of relief
for
does not constitute a judgment on
the merits and that in any event no
with reto the
was carried into
decree
are properly
an annulment
the

211 Cal.
183 CaL 335,
v. SanA.L.R. 342].)

[2]

was not entered into in

uv•c·"·''v"' that because the parties were in
of them was entitled to legal assistance with
when the decree of annulthe light of the findings of fact and
Vernon v. Superior Court,
; Gelfand v. O'Haver,
P.2d 790]), it is clear that it was
tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the
parties with
to their property interests. The situaanalogous to that in Olwell v. Hopkins,
tion is thus
28 Oal.2d 147 [168 P.2d 972], where it was held that a
of dismissal was res judicata when it appeared
that the dismissal was based upon a determination that the
contract sued upon was void. The court recognized that
''
a
of dismissal is not a judgment on
the merits and therefore does not operate as a bar to another
action on the same cause of action. This court has recognized, however, that a dismissal may follow an actual determination on the merits [citations] as have courts in other
. . . At the
upon their motion to dismiss the
defendants introduced in evidence
the record of the first action. It is clear from that record
that the one issue passed upon by the trial court in dismissing
the first aetion was that raised by defendants' eontention
that
cause of action was based upon a contract
that was void. The defense thus interposed went to the
merits
' eause of action. . . . [Defendants] raiRed
.,,,..,hrh'' right to recover under any eireumstanccs upon their alleged eause of aetion and upon
that issue the court rendered judgment against plaintiffs.''
Oal.2d at 149-150.) [4] The reasoning in the Olwell
1
'"'"""'"'.
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to establish
of the
He relies on evidence with respect
to the
of the property and the
dealings
therewith that the trial court found to be sufficient to estabelaim to a one-half interest without reference to
[5] As was pointed out in VaUera v.
sttpra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 685, the fact that a man and
woman do not in good faith believe
are married does
not
the court from protecting their
interests in jointly acquired property. Accordingly if Archie
advanced the theory of recovery he now relies upon in the
annulment action, the court erred in holding that the fact
the parties were in pari delicto prevented relief. [6] Alit does not appear that Archie sought to establish
his interest in the property in the annulment action on the
now
whether he did or
these actions
are barred by that adjudication. He now seeks to establish
the same
in the property that he sought to establish
in the annulment action, and the decision in that action
went to the merits of his claim. If the court in the
annulment action
applied the doctrine of pari
delicto to deny relief on the theory now advanced, Archie's
PaT1'"'""' was by appeal. On the other hand, if Archie failed
to present the present theory of recovery in the former
it is too late for him to do so now. The situation
indistinguishable from that in Krier v. Krier, 28
841
P.2d 681], where a wife
in successive actions to establish an interest in the same property on
different legal theories. ''In the prior
maintenance
action J\Irs. Krier
and
an
with
to her interest in the property. She here seeks a
second adjudication relative to her interest in the same
property. [7] It is settled, however, that a judgment in
a prior action between the same parties on the identical
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and a bar to a second suit
actually determined therei11
but also as to issues
involved.
[8] And even
the cause of action be different, the
determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent
suit between the
as to that issue and every
matter which
to sustain or defeat its
determination.
''
claimed the property in the prior action solely
as community property and having procured a decree
therein based on its character as such, Mrs. Krier is precluded from seeking in this later action another award
thereof based on an entirely different interest (homestead
or otherwise) existing, but unclaimed, at the time of the
earlier adjudication. Under the circumstances she was required to advance her entire interest, whether community
or homestead, or both, in order to permit the court to make
an effective and complete adjudication of the respective
interests of the parties. [Citation.] Not having done so,
she cannot relitigate the matter, whether it be held that the
two suits involved the same cause of action insofar as they
concerned her interest in the property, or merely involved
a common issue as to her interest in the property." (28
Cal.2d at 843-844.)
The judgments are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I do not agree that the finding of the trial court in the
annulment action brought by Alberta to the effect that "the
Court, therefore, makes no findings concerning the character
of the property set out in the first cause of action of [Alberta's] complaint" and the conclusion of law that "the
Court, finding both parties at fault in the purported marriage, declines for lack of jurisdiction to make any award
of property alleged to be community in character,'' constituted a binding determination of the property issue so as
to constitute a bar to the present actions. It was, in my
opinion, a specific declaration that the issue had not been
adjudicated.
''There can be no doubt that the dismissal of an action
or denial of relief for want of jurisdiction is not a judgment
on the merits, and cannot prevent the plaintiff from sub-
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[43 C.2d 677; 277 P.2d 4]

his action in any
and determine it. No
or
as to the matters ~·,_~,..~~
. Refusal to pass on a
is not an
on
vol. 2, p.
lll cOorrnick-Saeltzer Oo., 179 Cal.
court said : '
to the
closure suit, it is very plain that the court did not therein
undertake to pass upon the merits of the controversy between
Slaker and the McCormick-Saeltzer Company. What it did
u'as to decline to deterrnine that controversy,
the reason
that it tiJas without jttrisdiction, in that action, so to do.
Whether the holding that it had no jurisdiction was sottnd
or erroneous is not a question for consideration here. The
essential point is that there was no adjudication of the
merits. . . . " (Emphasis added.) It is elemental that a
judgment which has not been rendered on the merits is not
res judicata (Campanella v. Campanella, 204 Cal. 515 [269
P. 433] ; Goddar·d v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 14
Cal.2d 47, 52 [92 P.2d 804]; Gonsalves v. Bank of America,
16 Cal.2d 169, 173 [105 P.2d 118]; Everts v. Blaschko, 17
Cal.App.2d 188 [61 P.2d 776] ; Matteson v. Klump, 100 Cal.
App. 64 [279 P. 669]; Helvey v.
73 Cal.App.2d 667
[167 P.2d 492]; Jacobs v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc.,
4 Cal.App.2d 1 [40 P.2d 899] ; Miller v. Ambassador Park
Syndicate, 121 Cal.App. 92 [9 P.2d 267]; Taylor v. Darling,
22 Cal.App. 101 [133 P. 503]; Security T. & S. Bank v.
8o1lihern Pac. Co., 214 Cal. 81
P.2d 1015] ; Scheeline v.
111ashier, 172 Cal. 565 [158 P. 222]).
What the majority is saying is, in effect, this: When the
trial court determined it had no jurisdiction to decide the
question of property, it was really a determination on the
merits that neither party was entitled to relief and therefore
''tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the
parties with respect to their property interests." The trial
court specifically made no finding as to the character of the
property. As in the Slaker case, it
to determine
the
for the reason that it felt it was without
jurisdiction. "Whether the holding that it had no jurisdiction was sound or erroneous is not a question for consideration
here, The essential point is that there was no adjudication
uuLu'"'S

was

·if Archie
of recovet'Y in the former
it is too late for him to do so now.'' The rule set forth m
Krier v.
28 Cal.2d 841 [172 P.2d
, is not applicable
here. 'When a court specifically declines to pass upon an
the rule as to issues involved directly, or
involved
implication, does not apply.
Before the trial court could reach any conclusion with rcto the
property interests involved, it had
first to determine the character of the property. This it did
not do. That no determination was in fact made is borne
out by the language used in the conclusion of law wherein
comment is made concerning the ''alleged'' community character of the
. As we said in Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d
840. 843
P.2d 390], "While it is true that as a
is a bar as res judicata not only as
action on the same matter actually determined,
all issues that might have been litigated as
incident to or
connected with the subject matter
of the litigation and every matter coming within its legitimate
purview (Code Civ. Proc.,
1908, 1911; 15 Cal.Jnr. 142
, it is also true that that
is adjudged in a former
judgment ~ovhich appears upon its face to have been adjudged
or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
Civ. Proc., § 1911.) And when it
appears that an issue was not determined by

it
is not res j1tdicata upon that issue.
·is not an adjudication as to matters which the
court
CW atson v. Poore,
18 Cal.2d 302 [115 P.2d 478] 15 Cal.Jur. 150.)" (Emphasis
added.)
If we were not faced with the
that no determination was made as to the character of the property,
the position taken in the majority opinion might be entitled
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1s
view that the
fliet with the rule set forth in F'reeman on
Blaker v. McCormick-SaeUzer
supra, as well as
Stark v.
sttpra. 'rhe rule announced in the majority
opinion extends the doctrine of res judicata beyond its intended scope in that a
of this court there concludes,
the face of a clear statement
the trial court to the
that an issue was finally determined so as to constitute a bar to a second action. The
result of the
conclusion reached
the
is to
the
n such an action of his
I would affirm the
concurred.
Hespondeut's petition for a
was denied December 29, 1954. Shenk, J., Carter,
and Schauer,
were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

